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INTRODUCTION 
The plaintiffs were denied a fair trial on two fronts: First, by allowing the 
Hospital to tell the jury it was "your community hospital" and preventing any 
mention of its parent corporation, the trial court created in the minds of the jurors 
an incorrect impression about the nature of the Hospital and the trustworthiness 
of its witnesses. 
Second, by denying the plaintiffs any rebuttal testimony, the trial court 
misled the jury into thinking that the Hospital's witnesses could not be refuted. 
The trial court's errors, either alone or together, require a new trial. 
STANDARD OF REVIE>V 
Most of the trial court's errors were errors in the exclusion of evidence, 
which are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. The Hospital has cited language 
from selected cases suggesting that it is nearly impossible to show an abuse of 
discretion.1 
1
 See Br. of Appellee at 2-3 (citing Jones v. Layton/Okland, 2009 UT 39, f 
27, 214 P.3d 859 (an abuse of discretion occurs when ^ decision is "against the 
logic of the circumstances and so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock one's 
sense of justice" or results from "bias, prejudice, or r^alice") (citation omitted); 
Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 2001 UT 77, % 16,31 P.3d 557 (discretion is 
abused if "no reasonable [person] would take the view" the court adopted) 
(quoting State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 340 (Utah 1997)r which in turn was quoting 
State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885,887 (Utah 1978)); Marcfymd v. Marchand, 2006 UT 
App 429, f 4,147 P.3d 538 (an abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is 
"flagrantly unjust") (citation omitted), cert denied, 16$ P.3d 339 (Utah 2007)). 
1 
The abuse of discretion standard "is necessarily variable."2 In Utah, "the 
term 'abuse of discretion' has no tight meaning."3 "[I]t is seen by appellate courts 
as an efficient way of describing a more complex concept."4 As the court 
explained in Vena, a trial court's discretion falls along a spectrum "running from 
'de novo' [or no discretion] on the one hand to 'broad discretion' on the other."5 
Where the trial court has broad discretion, it has the freedom to make decisions 
that appellate judges might not make themselves if they were in the trial court's 
position. In effect, the trial judge has "the freedom to be wrong without 
incurring reversal."6 But "'[discretion does not mean immunity from 
accountability."'7 "When a trial court abuses its discretion, it has exceeded the 
range of discretion allowed for the particular act under review."8 The "real 
2
 HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOTT, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF 
REVIEW: REVIEW OF DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS AND AGENCY ACTIONS 67 (2007). 
3
 State v. Vena, 869 P.2d 932,937 (Utah 1994), modified on other grounds 
by State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50,144 P.3d 1096. 
4
 Rivera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2000 UT 36, f 7 n.2,1 P.3d 
539. 
5
 Perm, 869 P.2d at 937. 
6
 See id. at 937-38. 
7
 Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802,804 (7th Or. 1988) (quoting 1 
Weinstein's Evidence f 401[01]). 
8
 Rivera, 2000 UT 36, | 7 n.2. Cf., e.g., Radeljak v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 
719 N.W.2d 40,42 (Mich. 2006) ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision 
results in an outcome falling outside the principled range of outcomes."). 
2 
amount of [discretion] permitted a trial judge will vary depending on the legal 
issue"; a court's description of "the operative standard of review does not begin 
to reflect the many shades of this variation."9 
For the most part, the cases the Hospital relies on lie at the extreme end of 
the discretion spectrum.10 This Court has said that, ih reviewing a trial court's 
application of evidentiary rules, "'[ajn abuse of discretion occurs only when the 
trial court's ruling is "beyond the limits of reasonabijity."'"11 An abuse of 
discretion "'may be demonstrated by showing that the district court relied on "an 
erroneous conclusion of law" or that there was "no evidentiary basis for the trial 
court's ruling/""12 
Even if a particular ruling, viewed in isolation^ was within the trial court's 
discretion to make, where, as here, the cumulative effect of the trial court's 
rulings deprived the plaintiffs of a fair trial, the Court should find an abuse of 
9
 Pena, 869 P.2d at 938. 
10
 See Jones, 2009 UT 39 (review of a denial of a motion to vacate a 
judgment for excusable neglect); Marchand, 2006 UT App 429 (review of a child 
custody award); Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887 (review of a[ sentencing decision). Cf. 
Brewer, 2001 UT 77 (review of admission of expert scientific testimony over a 
claim that it was scientifically unreliable). 
11
 Vitale v. Belmont Springs, 916 R2d 359,3fel (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
(citations omitted). 
12
 Daniels v. Gamma W. Brachytherapy, LLC\ 2009 UT 66, % 32 (citations 
omitted). 
3 
discretion.13 An umpire, for example, may have some discretion in calling balls 
and strikes. When a pitch is on the edge of the plate, one umpire may call it a 
ball, while another may call it a strike, and either call is within the umpire's 
discretion to make. Neither team may have grounds to complain about an 
individual call. But when the calls as a whole take away part of the plate for one 
team but not the other, then the umpire has abused his discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
L 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY EXCLUDING ANY REFERENCE TO HCA. 
The trial court erred by precluding the plaintiffs from making any 
reference to HCA, the Hospital's parent company, because knowledge of the 
relationships between HCA and prospective jurors and witnesses was critical in 
determining their potential biases. 
The Hospital argues that its relationship with HCA was irrelevant because 
they are separate legal entities, HCA is not a party to this action, and HCA is not 
vicariously liable for the Hospital's negligence. 
13
 Cf. Walker v. Holiday Lanes, Inc., 413 R2d 63,68 (Kan. 1966) (in 
analyzing the record, it was not necessary to isolate each charge of error and 
determine whether or not it would justify a new trial; "all the charges must be 
considered together in relation to the record in its entirety," and, so considered, a 
new trial was warranted because "the various acts of misconduct... have so 
permeated and tainted the entire proceedings that plaintiff has been deprived of 
the fair trial to which every litigant is entitled"). 
4 
The plaintiffs do not claim that HCA is a party or is vicariously liable for 
the HospitaFs actions. They claim that the HospitaF$ relationship with HCA was 
relevant because it went to the potential bias of prospective jurors and witnesses. 
To say that the HospitaFs affiliation with HCA is irrelevant is like saying that the 
relationships of prospective jurors and witnesses to the Boy Scouts of America is 
irrelevant in a lawsuit against the Great Salt Lake CoUncil of the Boy Scouts or an 
individual Boy Scout troop. Someone with a relatiortship to the parent or 
umbrella organization is likely to be biased in favor 0f the related party.14 
A. The Trial Court Erred by Precluding the Plaintiffs from Mentioning 
HCA in Voir Dire, 
The Hospital argues that the trial court did not[ err in precluding the 
plaintiffs from mentioning HCA in voir dire because HCA was not a named 
party or real party in interest. 
This Court has repeatedly recognized the importance of voir dire in 
uncovering prospective jurors' potential biases, particularly in tort cases such as 
14
 See Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043,104446 (9th Cir. 1994) (vacating 
an arbitration award where the arbitrator's law firm had represented the parent 
company of a party, making the arbitrator "evidently partial/' even though the 
arbitrator did not know of this relationship at the tune of the arbitration); 
Empiregas, Inc. ofArdmore v. Hendy, 487 So.2d 244, 251 (Ala. 1985) (it was not error 
to allow a witness to be cross-examined on his interest in a party's parent 
corporation because it revealed the witness's potential bias), cert denied, 476 U.S. 
1116 (1986). 
5 
this.15 The fact that HCA was not a party to this action does not mean that the 
plaintiffs were not entitled to inquire into prospective jurors' contacts with HCA. 
HCA is the Hospital7 s parent company, and prospective jurors' attitudes toward 
a parent may affect their ability to impartially judge the parent's child. Indeed, 
other courts have recognized that voir dire questions about prospective jurors7 
relationships with a defendant's parent corporation are appropriate.16 
The Hospital argues that, even where a non-party, such as the defendant's 
liability insurer, is a real party in interest, a plaintiff is still not allowed to ask 
potential jurors about their involvement with the non-party. That is not Utah 
law.17 Utah Rule of Evidence 411, precluding mention of insurance, does not 
preclude asking about insurance for purposes other than to prove liability, such 
as to show bias or prejudice.18 In any event, the Hospital denies that HCA was its 
insurer (R. 1230, % 5), and the plaintiffs did not seek to mention insurance. 
15
 E.g., Alcazar v. University of Utah Hosps., 2008 UT App 222, f 10,188 
P.3d 490; Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 98-99 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Evans ex rel. 
Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460,462-63 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert denied, 836 P.2d 1383 
(Utah 1992). 
16
 See, e.g., Wallace v. Alabama Power Co., 497 So.2d 450,453-54 (Ala. 
1986); Bower v. Hog Builders, Inc., 461 S.W.2d 784,802 (Mo. 1970); Southern Bell Tel 
& Tel. Co. v. Shepard, 204 S.E.2d 11,12 (S.C. 1974). 
17
 See Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 381,105 P.2d 176,179 (1940) 
("Reasonable latitude should be given parties in ascertaining what affiliations 
jurors have with an interested party."). 
18
 Daniels v. Gamma W. Brachytherapy, LLC, 2009 UT 66, f 37. 
6 
The Hospital also argues that the trial court di4 not abuse its discretion 
because the plaintiffs did not ask all the "non-specifk, preliminary or threshold 
questions that could have ferreted out potential biases." (Br. of Appellee at 27.) 
Given the trial court's ruling on the matter (see R. 30|9, at 864:2-14 (noting that 
the court "will seriously consider a motion for mistrial if [HCA]'s mentioned 
again"), it is unlikely that the trial court would have allowed the plaintiffs to ask 
indirectly what they could not ask directly. Moreover, "non-specific" questions 
are likely to elicit non-specific answers. It is difficult if not impossible to elicit 
relevant information about potential jurors7 relationships with HCA without ever 
mentioning HCA.19 
B- The Trial Court Erred by Not Allowing the Plaintiffs to Show the 
Connection Between HCA and the Hospital to Correct the Hospital's 
Misleading Characterization of Itself, 
From the first day of trial, counsel for the Hospital tried to portray the 
Hospital to the jury as "your small, community hospital" and implied that both 
the hospital and the community would be damaged it the jury were to return a 
verdict for the plaintiffs. The trial court should have allowed the plaintiffs to 
19
 Cf. Southern Bell, 204 S.E.2d at 12 (a party had a legal right to 
ascertain whether or not any juror owned stock in th0 defendant's parent 
company, and "[t]his could only be determined by th^ trial judge submitting to 
the jury a direct question on this subject"). 
7 
show the connection between the Hospital and HCA, its parent corporation, to 
correct this misleading characterization. 
The Hospital argues that the trial court did not err because "community 
hospital" is a term of art, denoting a hospital's size and services, that the 
classification was relevant to the standard of care, and that any misconception 
was cured when the court struck "your" and "small" and when Dr. Yeast, the 
Hospital's expert, explained the term. 
The only evidence that "community hospital" was a term of art came from 
Dr. Yeast, who did not testify until ten days after the Hospital had told the jury 
that the plaintiffs were seeking $11 to $15 million from their small "community 
hospital." (See R. 3018, at 374:13-15; see also R. 3021, at 1560,1562,1565; R. 3022, at 
1608.) Counsel's unexplained use of the term in opening could only have been 
meant to prejudice the jury in favor of the Hospital and against the plaintiffs. 
Jurors had already indicated that they believed that verdicts against hospitals 
increased their health care costs. (See R. 3022, at 1585:2-15.) In any event, when 
Dr. Yeast defined "community hospital" as "a facility that provides general 
medical care, general obstetrical care, general surgical care" and "does not have a 
teaching role or a research role or a large referral base" (R. 3023, at 1948:12-16), he 
was using his own definition, not one recognized in the medical industry. So 
rather than clarifying matters, Dr. Yeast's explanation only served to further 
8 
mislead the jury. There was no evidence that the organizations that accredit and 
classify hospitals recognize a category of hospital cabled a "community hospital/7 
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services! classifies hospitals as "sole 
community hospitals" and "essential access commuiUty hospitals" for purposes 
of its prospective payment system, but the Hospital >vould not qualify under 
either category. (See R. 3022, at 1586:11~1587:24.)20 i \nd while the American 
Hospital Association has its own definition of "community hospital," its 
definition is so broad as to include just about every hospital except a prison 
hospital or college infirmary. (See R. 3022, at 1587:24t 1588:18.) There is no 
evidence that counsel for the Hospital was using the AHA's definition of 
community hospital when he referred to the Hospital as "your community 
hospital." Even if he were, without such evidence (ahd there was none), his 
comments could only mislead or confuse the jury. 
The Hospital argues that the plaintiffs' own expert, Dr. Elliott, explained 
that the standard of care for a community hospital did not require the Hospital to 
have 24-hour obstetrical coverage. Counsel for the Hjospital asked Dr. Elliott, 
"Now, in a small community hospital like Timpanog|o]s, you would agree that 
the standard of care did not require 24-hour coverage or obstetrical coverage, 
right?" Dr. Elliott replied, "Correct." (See R. 3020, at 1251:15-19.) "Small 
20
 See also 42 C.F.R. §§ 412.92 & 412.109. 
9 
community hospital" was counsel's term, not Dr. Elliott's. Dr. Elliott was 
referring to a guideline of the American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (ACOG) that, where a surgeon has to be called from the outside, a 
Caesarean section should be started within 30 minutes. (See R. 3020, at 1226:23-
1228:18.) The Hospital admitted it applied to "any hospital that does obstetrics," 
not just to "community" hospitals. (R. 3018, at 468:12-20.) Moreover, the alleged 
standard of care did not apply in this case because no one claimed that the 
Hospital was required to have 24-hour obstetrical coverage, and the Hospital in 
fact had a surgeon present who could have delivered the baby before Dr. 
Richards returned. (See R. 3020, at 1150:3-1152:12.) 
Finally, the fact that the trial court ordered the Hospital's modifiers 
("your" and "small") struck ten days after counsel told the jury that the plaintiffs 
were seeking millions of dollars "from your community hospital" (see R. 3018, at 
374:15-16), only shows that the Hospital's references were improper. The 
misleading impression the Hospital created should not have been allowed to 
permeate the trial for nearly two weeks. The trial court's ruling did not cure the 
prejudice to the plaintiffs any more than throwing a skunk out of the jury box ten 
days after the skunk secreted its spray would remedy the smell it left. 
10 
C. The Trial Court Erred by Precluding the Plaiijitiffs from Asking the 
Hospital's Witnesses About Their Relationships with HCA, 
Three of the Hospital's key witnesses—two facit witnesses (Virginia Law 
and Rynda Christensen) and their nursing expert (C^rol Harvey)—had significant 
relationships with HCA that the jury could have concluded colored their 
testimony. But the jury was not allowed to hear aboikt these relationships 
because the trial court precluded the plaintiffs from itientioning HCA. 
The Hospital argues that the trial court did nofj err because the probative 
value of such evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. In fact, it was 
the plaintiffs who were prejudiced by the trial court'$ ruling because they were 
denied the same opportunity the Hospital had to impeach the other side's 
witnesses for bias. 
The Hospital suggests that the credibility of Nurses Law and Christensen 
was not really at issue because the critical part of their testimony was 
undisputed, namely, that they did not ask Dr. Richards to stay at the Hospital 
and did not call him until 6:05 a.m. In fact, however, there were other aspects of 
their testimony where their credibility was critical. The plaintiffs claimed that the 
Hospital was negligent in allowing Nurse Law to be i|n charge of Mrs. 
Braithwaite because she did not have adequate training and experience in labor 
and delivery. {See, e.g., R. 3018, at 407:14-409:19.) Th^ evidence about Nurse 
Law's training and experience was disputed. (E.g., R^  3019, at 826:3-830:15, 
11 
831:17-832:21,836:14-837:22; R. 3022, at 1756:18-1757:14.) Nurse Law's credibility 
was therefore at issue, and the fact that she was employed by HCA at the time of 
her testimony was extremely relevant to her bias and motive to testify favorably 
for the Hospital. 
Carol Harvey, the Hospital's nursing expert, was the most critical witness 
in the case. She counted other HCA hospitals as her clients and had testified 
many times for them. (See R. 2529, at 17:12-14.) Yet the plaintiffs were not 
allowed to point this out to the jury. 
With Nurse Harvey, the Hospital again falls back on the fact that it and 
HCA are separate legal entities and argues that, because Nurse Harvey has never 
worked for HCA itself but has only testified for other HCA hospitals, HCA was 
irrelevant to the issue of bias. By the same reasoning, evidence of the Mafia 
would be irrelevant to show bias on the part of a witness who only counted 
individual mafiosi as clients. One can reasonably infer that a parent corporation 
will be reluctant to let its subsidiaries hire a witness who has testified 
unfavorably for other subsidiaries. 
While religiously observing the separate legal identities of HCA and its 
member hospitals, the Hospital ignored the fact that the plaintiffs and their 
counsel (or plaintiffs' counsel generally) are separate legal entities when it 
attacked the credibility of the plaintiffs' experts. It argued that the plaintiffs' 
12 
experts could not be believed because they had testified for other plaintiffs in the 
past (See Br. of Appellants at 25-30.) The fact that Ms. Harvey had testified for 
other HCA hospitals in the past was equally essential for the jury to give proper 
weight to her testimony.21 
The Hospital claims that it was not given free fein to explore the bias of 
plaintiffs' expert economist (Dr. Paul Randle) because the trial court deprived it 
of "the financial evidence that would show what Dr. Randle had to lose in the 
future should he give unfavorable testimony in this cfase." (Br. of Appellees at 
36.) In fact, the trial court allowed the Hospital to cross-examine Dr. Randle 
about how much money he had made working for tlje law firm representing the 
plaintiffs. (See R. 3021, at 1378:7-12.) The plaintiffs Were not even allowed to 
show that Ms. Harvey had testified for other hospitals owned by the Hospital's 
parent corporation, much less ask her how much mohey she had made from her 
testimony and hence how much she stood to lose froifn unfavorable testimony in 
this case. The two situations were not comparable, ai^d therein lies the problem. 
The Hospital claims that it was not error to preclude the plaintiffs from 
cross-examining Ms. Harvey about her relationship With HCA because they were 
able to show that she testified most of the time for ho$pitals. But it is one thing to 
21
 Cf. Board of Ed. ofS. Sanpete Sch. Dist. v. Bkrton, 617 P.2d 347,350 
(Utah 1980). 
13 
show that a witness generally defends the nursing care involved in a case and 
quite another to be able to show that she stands to lose repeat business from a 
corporation that owns some 340 other healthcare facilities around the country if 
she testifies unfavorably in this particular case. By preventing the plaintiffs from 
showing as much, the trial court unfairly limited their right of cross-examination 
on "a proper, important subject of cross-examination/7 namely, her bias, and its 
error "is ground for reversal/'22 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY EXCLUDING THE PLAINTIFFS' 
PROFFERED REBUTTAL EVIDENCE. 
The trial court denied the plaintiffs any rebuttal testimony. "Excluding a 
witness from testifying is . . . 'extreme in nature and . .. should be employed only 
with caution and restraint///23 This is particularly true of rebuttal evidence. The 
plaintiff, as the party with the burden of proof, is entitled to the last word. While 
a plaintiff must put on evidence of a prima facie case during his case-in-chief, 
that should not preclude him from rebutting the defendant's contrary evidence. 
22
 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 19, at 47 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th 
ed. 2006). See also State v. Leonard, 707 R2d 650, 656 (Utah 1985). 
23
 Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 830 P.2d 291,293 (Utah Ct. 
App.) (citation omitted), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). 
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A. The Trial Court Erred by Excluding Dr. Nag4otte's Testimony. 
The Hospital argues that the trial court did not err by refusing to let the 
plaintiffs call Dr. Michael Nageotte as a rebuttal witness because the plaintiffs 
could have called him in their case-in-chief. It is irorjic that the Hospital would 
even make this argument because it tried to prevent the plaintiffs from calling Dr. 
Nageotte in their case-in-chief. (See R. 1338-39.) In ahy event, the fact that the 
plaintiffs could have called Dr. Nageotte in their cas^-in-chief is not grounds for 
precluding them from calling Dr. Nageotte as a rebuttal witness.24 
The Hospital also argues that Dr. Nageotte wa$ properly excluded because 
his opinions would have been cumulative of the opiijions of the plaintiffs' 
liability experts, Dr. Mahlmeister and Dr. Elliott. Th^ fact that testimony may be 
"somewhat repetitive of testimony on issues addressed during" a party's case-in-
chief also does not justify excluding the testimony in tebuttal.25 The test for 
admission of rebuttal testimony is not whether the testimony is entirely new 
evidence but whether it tends to "refute, modify, exptain, or otherwise minimize 
or nullify" the opponent's evidence.26 
Astill v. Clark, 956 P.2d 1081,1086 (Utah C t App. 1998). 
Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329,1338 (Utah |1993). 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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Dr. Nageotte's testimony would have refuted and minimized Nurse 
Harvey's testimony. As explained more fully in point III, infra, the central issue 
in the case was whether the Hospital's nurses should have called Dr. Richards, 
Mrs. Braithwaite's OB/GYN, back to the Hospital before the catastrophic event at 
6:03 a.m. The evidence showed that, if the nurses had called Dr. Richards after 
the prolonged deceleration at 5:48 a.m., he would have returned to the Hospital 
and delivered Trevin by 6:13 a.m., and Trevin would have suffered no damage. 
Nurse Harvey, who claimed to be an expert in fetal heart monitoring, testified 
that the Hospital's nurses met the standard of care when they failed to call Dr. 
Richards until about 6:05 a.m. (R. 3022, at 1614:6-7,1613:14-20.) Dr. Nageotte, 
who wrote the book on fetal heart monitoring (R. 1357), would have testified that 
the nurses should have called Dr. Richards no later than 5:55 a.m. given the 
clinical picture. (E.g., R. 1947, at 60:16-25; R. 1946, at 86:13-22.). 
According to Nurse Harvey, it did not matter how many decelerations 
occurred before 6:03 a.m. or how prolonged they were as long as the baby was 
not acidotic, and, as the Hospital notes, everyone agreed that Trevin was not 
acidotic until 6:03 a.m. Nurse Harvey testified that the fetal heart tracings were 
never non-reassuring and that there was nothing predictive of an obstetrical 
crisis before the 6:03 a.m. deceleration. (See, e.g., R. 3022, at 1728:23-1729:11, 
16 
1822:22-16.) Dr. Nageotte would have rebutted Nur$e Harvey's interpretation of 
the fetal monitoring strips. (See R. 3023, at 2085:22-24) 
Nurse Harvey also testified that there was no significant difference 
between the prolonged deceleration that Mrs. BraithWaite experienced at 4:37 
a.m., when Dr. Richards was in the Hospital, and th^ one she experienced at 5:48 
a.m., when Dr. Richards was not in the Hospital, so there was no reason a nurse 
should have called Dr. Richards after the 5:48 deceleration. (R. 3022, at 1724:12-
20; 1726:1-3; 1727:20-1728:22.) Dr. Nageotte would h^ve testified that the 5:48 
a.m. deceleration was definitely more significant thart the earlier deceleration, 
requiring the nurses to call Dr. Richards. (See, e.g., R. 1947, at 60:16-18; R. 1946, at 
85:15-86:22.) 
Dr. Nageotte's testimony would not have been merely "cumulative" of Dr. 
Elliott's, as the trial court thought. In fact, Dr. Nageotte disagreed with Dr. 
Elliott's opinions in several respects (e.g., with his criticisms of Dr. Richards). In 
any event, the fact that a rebuttal witness's testimony may be cumulative of other 
evidence is not sufficient reason to exclude it.27 
B. The Trial Court Erred by Excluding Nurse Walker's Testimony. 
The plaintiffs sought to call Nurse Judith Walker, who would have testified 
that what Nurse Harvey told the jury was different fr^m what she taught nurses. 
27
 Ram#e,862P.2datl338. 
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Ms. Harvey herself told the jury that she did not want them to think that she was 
not testifying the same as she had in other places. (R. 3022, at 1655:8-10.) The 
plaintiffs were prepared to show that she testified one way and taught another. 
The trial court denied the plaintiffs leave to call Ms. Walker because, it 
concluded, she was not timely designated under Turner v. Nelson.7* Turner held 
that, where the trial court had ordered the parties to disclose all potential 
witnesses before trial, a rebuttal witness called to rebut testimony that "could 
reasonably have been anticipated prior to trial" had to be disclosed before trial.29 
Turner was decided before the 1999 amendments to the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 26(a)(4) now requires parties to disclose the names of witnesses 
at least thirty days before trial unless the witness's testimony is "solely for 
impeachment." Ms. Walker's testimony was solely for impeachment; therefore, 
she did not have to be disclosed sooner. In any event, the need for her testimony 
could not have been anticipated until Nurse Harvey testified; until then, the 
plaintiffs could not tell that Ms. Harvey would testify differently from the way 
she teaches nurses. 
872 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1994). 
See id. at 1024 (citations and emphasis omitted). 
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Relying on Dansak v. Deluke,30 the Hospital also alleges that the plaintiffs' 
offer of proof was insufficient. The trial court did nc t^ find the plaintiffs' offer 
insufficient but denied the plaintiffs the right to call ijvls. Warner only because of 
the alleged untimeliness of her disclosure. Where, ag here, the preclusion of a 
witness's testimony was not an evidentiary ruling bi^t a case management 
decision, any deficiency in the proffer of testimony is| irrelevant and does not 
preclude this Court from considering the issue on appeal.31 
Moreover, in Dansak, the offer of proof was inadequate because the 
testimony the witness would have offered was "clearly inadmissible/'32 Plaintiffs 
indicated that Ms. Warner would have testified that \yhat Ms. Harvey said about 
how "she generally teaches nurses about how they n^ed to behave" and "the 
mistakes that are made" was different from what she teaches nurses," 
specifically, that what Ms. Harvey told the jury "aboiit when to respond to 
decelerations, [and] what's appropriate for nurses as ^ reassuring thing" was 
different from what she teaches nurses. (See R. 3023, ^t 2081:14-2083:20; see also R. 
3023, at 2077:20-2078:14.) Such a proffer was sufficient to let the trial court know 
the substance of Ms. Warner's proposed testimony. 
30
 12 Utah 2d 302,366 P.2d 67 (1961). 
31
 See Berrett, 830 P.2d at 295-96. 
32
 Dansak, 366 P.2d at 70. 
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C The Trial Court Erred by Excluding Nurse Anderson's Testimony. 
The plaintiffs sought to read the deposition of Laurie Anderson in rebuttal. 
Nurse Anderson was the Hospital's designated expert on the nursing standard of 
care until after the deadline for designating expert witnesses had passed and new 
counsel had entered their appearance for the Hospital. The trial court denied the 
plaintiffs' request on the grounds that Nurse Anderson was not qualified to give 
expert testimony and her testimony would have been cumulative of Dr. 
Mahlmeister's. 
The Hospital argues that the trial court was correct in concluding that 
Nurse Anderson was not qualified. The Hospital's position is curious given the 
fact that it was the Hospital who designated and offered Nurse Anderson as an 
expert. (See R. 247-49.) Even when it was trying to replace her with Nurse 
Harvey, the Hospital never claimed she was unqualified to give expert 
testimony. Although Utah Rule of Evidence 607 did away with the common-law 
prohibition of a party impeaching its own witness, the rationale for the rule is 
that, under modern evidence law, the party calling a witness "rarely has a free 
choice in selecting them."33 That rationale does not apply to expert witnesses. 
33
 FED. R. EVID. 607 adv. comm. n. to 1972 proposed rules. Utah rule 
607 "is the federal rule, verbatim." UTAH R. EviD. 607 adv. comm. n. 
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The Hospital had a free choice in selecting its own experts. Thus, the Hospital 
should not be able to challenge its own expert's qualifications. 
In any event, Nurse Anderson was qualified by her education, training, 
and experience to give expert testimony. 
The Hospital argues that, because Nurse Anderson had not worked as a 
labor and delivery nurse since 1985 and had not taugjht labor and delivery nurses 
since 1995, she was not qualified to opine on the standard of care on January 2, 
1999, when Trevin was born. But there was no evidence that the standard of care 
for nurses reading fetal heart monitors had changed $ince Nurse Anderson 
stopped teaching. Indeed, the evidence suggested thftt the guidelines that Dr. 
Mahlmeister published in 1994 applied in this case. 0ee R. 3018, at 388:8-22; 
504:5-18.) Although Dr. Mahlmeister testified that he^ publication would likely 
have been withdrawn in about 2000 (R. 3018, at 504:l$-24), the Hospital did not 
dispute that her guidelines accurately set out the standard of care, nor did they 
seek to exclude Dr. Mahlmeister from testifying as an|expert because she was 
unqualified, even though she had not worked as a ful^-time labor and delivery 
nurse since 1984 and not acted as a charge nurse since about 1995. (R. 3018, at 
505:19-506:1.) The Hospital itself relied on ACOG standards that were adopted in 
1992. (See, e.g., R. 3018, at 627:13-20.) Nurse Harvey, ^he Hospital's expert, 
testified that some of her training in interpreting fetal hionitoring strips dated 
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from the 1980s. (R. 3022, at 1613:21-1619:8; 1621:24-1622:7.) She further testified 
that the Hospital's example fetal monitor used at trial was "a generation 
improved to what we had in" 1983 or 1984 and that the monitors "last for about 
. . . ten years/' suggesting that the monitor that was used in Mrs. Braithwaite's 
delivery was ctlso used in 1994, when Nurse Anderson was teaching nurses how 
to read the monitors. 
As for the allegedly cumulative nature of Nurse Anderson's testimony, her 
testimony would not have duplicated Dr. Mahlmeister's. Although she was 
critical of the Hospital's nurses in some respects, she also disagreed with Dr. 
Mahlmeister in other respects, which the Hospital could have pointed out on 
cross-examination. Moreover, as shown above, the mere fact that rebuttal 
testimony may be somewhat cumulative of other testimony is not grounds to 
exclude it. And the fact that Nurse Anderson was a local nurse without any ties 
to HCA other than the fact that she was hired by the Hospital in this case would 
have increased her credibility with the jury. The plaintiffs were therefore 
prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to allow them to call Nurse Anderson as a 
rebuttal witness. 
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HL 
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE TRIAL COURTS RULINGS 
DEPRIVED THE PLAINTIFFS OF A FAIR TRIAL. 
The Hospital argues that none of the trial courts rulings constitute 
reversible error because all of the witnesses agreed tliat the fetal heart tracings 
did not give the Hospital's nurses any cause for alariti or any reason to believe 
that Mrs. Braithwaite would not give birth to a healttjy baby until the 
deceleration at 6:03 a.m., and Dr. Richards was promptly called after that. The 
Hospital overstates the evidence. 
Although all the witnesses agreed that Trevin ^raithwaite was not acidotic 
until 6:03 a.m., the witnesses disagreed sharply over whether the standard of care 
required that the nurses call Dr. Richards after earlier decelerations. The 
witnesses disagreed about whether there was a significant pattern of 
decelerations that made it likely that Mrs. Braithwaite would need a Caesarean 
section. (Compare, e.g., R. 3022, at 1728:23-1729:11,1731:4-7 (testimony of Carol 
Harvey), with R. 3020, at 1191:22-1192:4; 1195:11-17; 1203:22-1204:18; 1206:14-25; 
1266:11-1268:20 (testimony of Dr. Elliott).) Once Dr. Richards was called, he was 
back at the Hospital within fifteen minutes (see R. 301^, at 950:13-22.), and 
delivered Trevin within eight minutes after that. (See R. 3019, at 950:13-22.) Dr. 
Richards testified that, if he had been called at 5:50 a.rh., he would have returned 
to the Hospital with the same speed. (R. 3019, at 949:^0-950:7.) The jury could 
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reasonably conclude that if Dr. Richards had been called after the deceleration at 
5:48 a.m., Trevin would have been delivered by about 6:13 a.m. The evidence 
also showed that, if Trevin had been delivered by about 6:13, he would not have 
suffered any injury. (R. 3018, at 563:15-564:8; R. 3020, at 1197:7-1198:7.) Thus, the 
question was not whether Trevin was acidotic before 6:03 a.m. (everyone agreed 
he was not) but whether Dr. Richards should have been notified of the pattern of 
decelerations before 6:03, in which case Trevin would not have suffered any 
injury. 
The critical issue in the case was strongly disputed. The jury believed the 
Hospital, but trial court's errors prevented the plaintiffs from showing the biases 
of the Hospital's witnesses and refuting their testimony. Therefore, the trial 
court's errors, taken together, were harmful, requiring a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court deprived the plaintiffs of a fair trial when it refused to let 
them mention HCA, the Hospital's parent company, and refused to allow them 
any rebuttal testimony. The Court should therefore reverse the judgment and 
remand this case for a new trial. 
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